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This paper has been prepared as a part of a broader Ezoneplus project that
evaluates European Monetary Union (EMU) and its enlargement to prospective
members in central and eastern Europe. The project is financially supported by 
European Commission (HPSE-CT-2001-00084).   3 
1. INITIAL REMARKS: THE SECOND STAGE OF EZONEPLUS 
Within Ezoneplus
1 the Social Dimension is a hybrid in the sense that it addresses both the 
reshaping of certain policies and the socio-political repercussions an Eastward enlargement of the 
euro-zone may have. Correspondingly, key questions to be answered can be grouped under two 
headings: Firstly, what kind of external shocks does EU enlargement, and more specifically, the 
enlargement of EMU produce on national and EU policies? The three policy areas here to be 
inspected are social security systems, labour market regulation, and EU structural and agricultural 
policy. Secondly, how do national societies and political systems respond to these new 
constraints? This implies both potential social conflicts enhanced by the enlargement process, as 
well as their implications for national policy-making. In order to combine both topics, we suggest 
an analysis using insights of modern political economy (Kemmerling '02b). In brief, this is to say 
that rational political actors act in response to Ezoneplus in a way predictable once the socio-
economic outcomes of the enlargement process have been analysed. 
Since the Social Dimension is a very broad topic, some basic assumptions derived from 
previous stages of the project may be helpful in defining the key channels by which Eastward 
enlargement will affect national societies. For a digest of the major findings of our market reports 
(cf. the corresponding Ezoneplus Working Papers), several points are worth noting: 1) The 
integration of goods markets has already been accomplished to a considerable extent. Hence, 
apart from some redistributive problems arising in boarder regions (e.g. Quaisser 2000), trade will 
not be a major challenge from the perspective of the Social Dimension. 2) Similarly, the better part 
of FDI-flows are enhancing market efficiency and are less of a problem in terms of ‘locational’ 
competition between countries. Nevertheless, this topic remains high on the political agenda and 
anecdotal evidence suggests the opposite (Kittel '01).
2 Integrating FDI-flows in the broader 
perspective of enlarging financial markets, capital flows may imply new sources of risk for both 
candidate and member countries. Moreover, integrating capital markets will lead to higher 
divergence in regional growth and, therefore, constitutes a potential source of social and political 
discontent in terms of inequality. 3) The analysis of Monetary, Fiscal and Exchange Policy 
suggests that candidate countries in particular, might (have to) follow a strategy of a hard ‘over-
commitment’ (cf. contributions of Orsi and Fahrholz in Bolle '02) to the EMU-integration 
process. In order to assure a smooth transit to EMU, governments and central banks in Eastern 
Europe will probably face incentives to follow strict macroeconomic policies. This, in turn, 
implies some serious policy constraints for social security systems and labour markets. 4) Not 
least because of that, labour markets will be a pivotal area of concern for both member and 
candidate countries.  
Negative shocks candidate countries face by joining the currency union may induce an 
outflow of workers to adjacent member countries. But since most current members are reluctant 
or unable to integrate a considerable amounts of foreign workforce, labour market issues embody 
one of the true sources of predicament for the enlargement process. This is particularly the case 
for the two countries most affected, namely Austria and Germany. Moreover, the devastating 
performance of Eastern German labour markets and its consequences for the public budget, may 
serve as a reminder that East-West integration processes may be costly in both social and 
monetary terms (Sinn '99). This Regional Input compares the socio-economic impact of Ezoneplus 
in Austria and Germany to that of three other Western European EU-countries: France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. By this means, it is able to exemplify some of the major social and political 
issues in the course of enlarging the euro-zone in their current evolution as well as important 
cross-country differences. 
                                                 
1 Ezoneplus is a research project funded by the EU commission to investigate the prospective enlargement of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). For details see www.ezoneplus.org.  
2 Caetano et al. (2002: 42) show that the extent of diversion of FDI-inflows from South East to Eastern Europe will 
be rather small.   4 
2. KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
2.1. Unemployment Rates 
Since we believe that the reshaping of labour markets across Europe is of primordial 
importance for the whole process of integration, we have chosen to focus on three socio-
economic problems closely related to labour market outcomes: unemployment, poverty and 
inequality. Poverty is arguably less of a political issue in Western Europe, inasmuch as the 
observable impact of the Eastward enlargement on western European poverty rates is concerned. 
Moreover, in affluent societies absolute measures of poverty are not very informative. Because of 
this we have decided to drop this category for our country sample. Unemployment, in turn, is 
high on the political agenda in many continental European countries, and, in particular, in 
Germany (Baxandall '01). Hence, we presume it to be a major source of political contest in the 
wake of enlargement. Inequality, finally, is of societal and political relevance and a cornerstone 
for modelling the political economy of integration (Persson and Tabellini 2002: 132-140). It is 
one of the few examples where prosperous efficiency-driven economic trends may have 
unfavourable social and political consequences, if the ‘fruits’ of these trends are heavily 
concentrated on the (old and new) rich.  
In contrast to the Regional Inputs on Labour Markets, this RI tackles unemployment 
from another angle. It focuses on the question in which regions, sectors and age groups 
unemployment is concentrated. To put it more bluntly: Who are the losers of short-term 
enlargement costs as far as the labour market is concerned? Table 1 gives a general overview of 
unemployment in the five countries analysed here. It compares average national unemployment 
rates to unemployment in those segments of the population that are likely to be affected by 
enlargement because of their general sensitivity towards shocks (Blundell and MaCurdy '99).    5 
 
Table 1 Sensitive segments of labour markets 
 
Country standard  UR 
(2001) 
UR by education level (2000)  UR by sex (2001)  UR by age (1999) 
(male/female) 
   low  middle  high  men  women  15-24  50-64 
Belgium    6,6 9,3 5,5 2,4 6  7,4  22.7/22.4 7.1/5 
Germany  7,9  14  8 4,2 7,7 8,1  9.9/7.7 12.8/11.4 
France  8,6  14 2,6 1,9 7,1 10,5  24.9/28.4 9/8.3 
Netherlands  2,4 3,4 1,8 1,7 1,9  3  6.6/8.2 4.4/1.6 
Austria  3,6 8,2  4 2,4  3 4,3  5.5/6.4 4.4/5.3 
Euro-area  7,4  11,2 7,5  5 6,4 8,7  17.1/19.6* 8/7.3* 
Source: (Eurostat '02). UR = unemployment rates, Cronos Labour Force Survey3, 
data for EU-15. 
 
Table 1 gives a brief overview of unemployment rates in the five countries. Several key 
issues are worth noting: As is well-known, standard unemployment rates differ dramatically 
across countries. Whereas unemployment virtually does not exist in the Netherlands, and is very 
low in Austria, France, Germany and Belgium have high and persistent unemployment rates. In 
the table, average unemployment rates are compared to those of particular segments of the 
labour market. In all countries there is a strong tendency of low-skilled employees to be 
unemployed. For a French employee with a basic level of education the likelihood of being 
unemployed is five times higher than for an employee with intermediate qualifications. Low-
qualification is the most important determinant of unemployment on the individual level 
(Commission 02: 29). Next, female employees are somewhat more likely to be unemployed than 
male. The difference, however, is marginal.
4 This is not the case for unemployment rates in 
different age categories. Belgian and French youth is strongly affected by unemployment, whereas 
in Germany older people are more seriously affected by labour market constraints than the rest 
of the population. Ethnicity, finally, is in all countries a social cleavage segmenting national 
labour markets. For Germany unemployment rates of people with other citizenships than the 
German have tripled in the last 25 years (Stat. Bundesamt 01) and are currently about twice as 
high as the national average. For the other countries unemployment rates of ethnic minorities 
and non-citizens typically range between two and six times higher than the national averages 
(Eurostat March 2000). 
Another feature of unemployment is its regional variation within countries (Commission 
'02: 126). Germany here is a prime example: average unemployment rates are more than twice as 
high in Eastern Germany as in Western Germany (ibid.). Though this is clearly a legacy of the 
German unification, regional variance is high in Belgium and France as well. These countries 
mirror the trend of regional diversity in the whole of Europe.
5 Austria and the Netherlands show 
less of a variation, even controlled for the low national level of unemployment (ibid.).  
At least in the short run, enlargement of the Eurozone arguably causes some adjustment 
costs for labour markets. Though simulation studies still produce some significantly different 
results (Kiander et al. ’02; Boeri et al. ’00), the short term problem of higher unemployment rates 
is one of the most frequent scenarios in these studies. If, therefore, enlargement constitutes such 
                                                 
3 http://www.scb.se/internationellt/eu/Unemployment.xls (date of access 11.03.03). 
4 Needless to say that similar observations don’t apply for the case of employment rates, for instance. 
5 In the year 2000 unemployment in the richest regions of the EU was less than half (5.5 %) of that of the poorest 
regions (12.7) (Commission ’02: 132).   6 
a temporary negative shock, the sensitive segments of labour markets should be expected to 
suffer most from it. 
 
2.2. Measures of Inequality 
Reducing inequality is one of the self-declared aims of many European welfare states and, 
according to some scholars, a basic ‘ingredient’ of the European social model (Kittel '01). It is 
also frequently mentioned as a potential source for social conflicts across different social strata 
(Castranova 01; Harms and Zink 02). 
In general, income inequality after taxes and transfers is comparatively small in most 
continental European countries. This becomes obvious if you compare the indices of Table 2 to 
EU averages. However, the redistributive impact of the welfare state does vary substantially 
between the five countries. Pre- and after transfer inequality remains almost the same in 
Germany, whereas it drops substantively for the four other countries. Moreover, inequality is 
‘unequal’ across countries, since in Belgium, for example, the spread between top and bottom 
earners is much larger than for Austria and Germany. Finally, the incidence of low-wage work is 
– according to Eurostat statistics – highest in Germany and very low in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. In addition, low-wage work is typically concentrated in certain economic sectors 
such as agriculture and low productivity jobs in the service sector (Eurostat 2000). 
 
Table 2 Indicators of Income Inequality 













































3.7 5.5 4.6 4.4 4.4  5.0 
D5/D1 2.1  1.6  2.0 2.4 2.0  2.2** 
Low-wage 
(1996)  
8 4 9 11  6  9** 
Sources: GINI/TI = Gini-coefficient of Total Income after taxes and transfers (Luxembourg Income Study and 
Eurostat), GINI/ PI = Gini coefficient of Primary Income before taxes and transfers (Eurostat), S80/S20 
(Eurostat), Low-wage (Eurostat and ECHP) = percentage of low-wage employees (60 % of mean income) of all 
employees, S80/S20 and D5/D1 (Eurostat and ECHP respectively). 
* without Portugal 
** without Sweden and Finland 
The temporal evolution of inequality shows a rising trend across most European 
countries. For the five countries the inequality of factor incomes has risen with the exception of 
the Netherlands, where Gini coefficients of factor income have, in fact, been rising across the 80s 
and early 90s. Contrary to factor income shares of poor and rich, the inequality of disposable 
income after taxes and transfers has remained rather stable in all countries (Milanovic 00: 46-49). 
Rather unsurprisingly, this is not the case for some regions within countries such as Eastern 
Germany where income inequality in terms of factor income has increased to a considerable 
extent whereas inequality of disposable income sank throughout the 90s (DIW Wochenbericht 
19/00).   7 
All things considered, continental Europe differs less in terms of inequality than in terms 
of unemployment. The risk of being unemployed varies pronouncedly across countries, and 
hence enlargement will affect the five countries in very different ways as far as the labour market 
is concerned. Some segments of the labour seem to be particularly vulnerable to future economic 
shocks such as enlargement. It is in these segments where social and political concerns about the 
consequences of Ezoneplus should be most visible. Cross-country differences in inequality are 
shown to be less dramatic between continental European countries. Similar levels of inequality, 
however, disguise fundamental differences in the causes and social costs of inequality. The quick 
look at the data is therefore merely a first step in analysing the Social Dimension of Ezoneplus.  
Whether enlargement has a significant impact on income inequality in Western Europe 
depends on which of the causal channels of enlargement on inequality is relevant. First, inequality 
may be increased by additional inflows of low-skilled labour to Western Europe. Since migration, 
however, in turn, depends on EU unemployment rates this prompts the question how labour 
market regulation is affected by enlargement. Second, enlargement may constrain national social 
and redistributive policies such that public means of reducing inequality may be hampered. Third, 
enlargement will also lead to reallocations of EU-transfers, which may also lead to a change in 
cross-national inequality in the West if it is not compensated by national policies. It is these three 
policy areas that are inspected more closely right in the next section. 
 
3. THE RESHAPING OF SOCIAL AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
3.1. Labour Market Policies and Industrial Relations 
The RI on Labour Markets initiated a discussion on the question whether ‘real rigidities’ 
are reduced by eastward enlargement (Kemmerling, et al. '02). A preliminary conclusion was that 
– so far – little impact could be seen in terms of making Western European labour markets more 
flexible (ibid.: 15). This part of the RI comes back to that issue and delves into the theoretical 
discussions surrounding the flexibility/ endogenous policy debate. However, it starts with a 
detour, since most of the relevant literature deals with the question whether EMU has generated 
more flexibility in European labour markets. 
Michael Burda (Burda '01) argues that the Euro will put trade unions and national labour 
market regulation under pressure. For him, the Euro is a ‘Trojan horse’ (2001: 23) with which 
politicians introduce deregulation to rigid European labour markets. He bases his claims on the 
observation that under a unified currency regime the pressure on national collective bargain 
systems has significantly increased (2001: 17). Though there is some evidence that wage restraint 
and flexible adjustment paths are more frequent in the last few years (Kemmerling, Pogodda, and 
Spannbauer '02), there is also evidence that these forms of new flexibility have been traded-off 
against new forms of rigidities such as increasing wage compression. Moreover, as Burda 
explicitly states (Burda '01), increasing pressure depends on the lack of accommodation from 
social security systems, namely unemployment benefits. Yet structural reforms have been 
strikingly absent in these areas so far (Kemmerling, Pogodda, and Spannbauer '02). But even on 
his own grounds, Burda’s argument is vulnerable as Sibert and Sutherland (Sibert and Sutherland 
'00) have shown. A monetary union does not automatically induce a higher level of structural 
reforms in labour markets. To the contrary, the inflation bias of a monetary union may, in fact, 
be higher than under the previous regime, as policy reform becomes more painful for rational 
policy-makers. They condition their claims on the extent with which asymmetric output shocks 
occur in a unified Europe. Even more importantly, these shocks, in turn, are – at least partially – 
due to different forms of labour market regulation (Kemmerling '02a). Microeconomic theories 
of labour market regulation indeed suggests that the obstacles to pernicious labour market 
institutions are large (Saint-Paul 2000). Hence, low levels of reform may be a stable, though not 
very beneficial equilibrium.    8 
The debate shows that – so far – the channels from monetary union to labour market 
reform are little understood. This is all the more the case for the eastward enlargement of the 
euro-zone, since estimates of labour market and output shocks stemming from the enlargement 
differ considerably. Once more, one has to point out that, although for the whole of the EU such 
a shock will be comparatively small (Boeri '00), its potential for Germany and Austria must not 
be understated (Kemmerling, Pogodda, and Spannbauer '02).
6 The major channel to be 
investigated here is migration and ‘forfeited’ migration due to high levels of unemployment – at 
least in Germany – as well as due to postponing the freedom of settlement for CEEC-workers.  
This discussion is necessarily linked to a second one dealing with the problem of 
‘locational competition’ (Standortwettbewerb) and the claim of wage dumping. We do not want 
to adopt a normative point of view in this discussion, but we simply state that, empirically, such a 
claim cannot be entirely rejected. Caetano et al. (2002: 40), for instance, find that differentials in 
labour costs do play a role in determining the extent of bilateral FDI-flows between Western and 
Eastern Europe. Of course, these results are of the partial equilibrium type and, hence, have to be 
treated with outmost delicacy. Brown et al. (Brown, et al. '96) build a theoretical general 
equilibrium model showing that under particular circumstances, negative partial equilibrium 
results may also be translated to the general approach. In a similar vein, Casella (Casella '96), 
claims that a necessary condition for an efficient solution of the problem of different standards is 
the convergence of income levels across countries. This debate, therefore, mirrors the debate on 
the Euro and real rigidities. To put it bluntly: if enlargement is a success, it is a self-stabilising 
success, if it isn’t, it isn’t!  
There is, however, more to say on this issue once it is put into the broader perspective of 
social dumping in general. Sinn (Sinn '00; Sinn '01), for example, strongly argues that even with 
factor price convergence in the long run, the externalities produced by different standards of 
social security across Europe, will have detrimental effects on the welfare of Western European 
economies. Moreover, in the public debate the empirical validity of these claims may matter less 
than their sheer, ‘apparent’ cogency. Rational political actors may take up these arguments to 
pursue their own interest-maximising strategies (cf. Box 1). 
                                                 
6 In this RI, we refrain from taking into account the potentially detrimental impact of trade and FDIs on southern 
European economies.   9 
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Box 1 How to explain the bargaining outcome between the EU and Poland – the case of 
migration 
 
Economic analyses of the economic impact the Eastward enlargement has overwhelmingly 
supported the idea that the net value of integration is positive (Baldwin, et al. '97). Even if we 
restrict the analysis to labour markets only, costs of integration such as rising unemployment 
should be relatively small compared to the possible gains (Kemmerling, Pogodda, and 
Spannbauer '02). How, then, do we account for the fact that most policy-makers in member 
states are reluctant towards a complete opening of labour markets?  
One way to deal with the topic is to suppose that there are powerful interest groups within society that, fearing 
potential looses for their own clientele, veto an immediate liberalisation of labour markets between East and West. 
This would be one possibility of explaining why Austria and Germany insisted on delaying the freedom of 
settlements for CEEC workers during the bilateral negotiations between the EU and Poland. A stylised model for 
Germany would then ask why trade unions representing such a ‚veto-player’ managed to convince the government to 
do so. 
In this model there are two players: a trade union (TU) and an employers’ association (EA). Both players may 
propose whether the government should go for an immediate adoption of the social acquis (S), containing all EU-
standardised rules that would raise labour costs in CEECs, and an immediate adoption of the freedom of 
settlements, migration (M) for short. Standard accounts of international trade theory imply the following preference 
orderings for both actors: 
 
) 2 ( ) 4 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( :
) 2 ( ) 4 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( :
SM M S M S SM SM M S TU
M S SM SM M S M S SM EA
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where  SM is the status quo meaning that accession candidates do not have to apply the acquis and member 
countries do not have to open their labour markets. For EA the worst option is no migration and no social acquis. 
This is straightforward, as open product markets mean competition from neighbor countries with lower social 
standards, whereas German producers cannot benefit from cheaper foreign labour. For obvious reasons SM is then 
their best options. The other two options are in the middle of the ordering, with migration being somewhat more 
important than making foreign producers applying EU-standards. This is not a crucial assumption, but might be 
justified by different production technologies.  
The situation for trade unions is very different since no EU-standards but migration would be the worst case for 
them. To negotiate both EU-standards and migration ranks as worst but one option. Even the status quo is better 
than that and only beaten by their first preference: no migration (hence no wage pressure), but the export of EU-
standards. In this game all strictly dominated strategies may be removed (right hand side of the arrows).  
Correspondingly, there seems to be a tie between both actors. However, we have explicitly modelled the status quo 
as part of the preference ordering. Since both actors are assumed to be veto-players, they have the power to induce 
the status quo whenever they want to. This turns out to be of crucial advantage for the unions, since they can now 
propose the following agenda: either postponing migration and exporting social standards or staying with the status 
quo. The employer association, and hence the government, have to accept this because no other strategy would make 














Of the two equilibrium (4*,2*), (3*,1*) only the first one is a stable outcome and resembles the actual (short-term) 
outcome achieved in the negotiations between the EU and Poland. 
   10 
The example of Box 1 is only a very stylised attempt to explain why national governments 
may be reluctant to reap the whole lot of benefits, economic integration would keep in store. 
Another example is dealt with later on, when we discuss the role of public opinion in the 
enlargement process (cf. following section). How to deal with potentially powerful short-term 
losers of the integration process, informs our general hypothesis in this section: governments 
may be hesitant to make national labour markets ready for enlargement, since the political costs 
of doing so could be insurmountable. An array of anecdotal evidence should help to bolster this 
argument empirically. Hence, in the following the RI turns to each country briefly, in order to 
give a short overview over current reform debates in the areas of labour market policy and 
regulation as well as the wage bargaining system.
7  
In Austria, labour market conditions are, in general, rather favourable. The 
unemployment rate, in particular, has never been on alarmingly high levels, and other 
macroeconomic indicators are also promising. Two problems, however, are frequently mentioned 
in benchmarking studies. First, the amount of people in early retirement schemes (including those 
for invalidity retirement) is high. Hence, a part of the good labour market performance is due to 
increasing the burden of public budgets (see below). Second, most of the unemployed are low-
skilled, which implies that competition from CEECs may be particularly harmful for the 
respective sectors and jobs. Nevertheless, one cornerstone for Austrian stability has been the 
comparatively flexible and competitive outcomes of collective bargaining. Rather ironically, a 
well-functioning labour market implies that migration from CEECs is stimulated.
8 Apart from 
proximity and cultural ties, this is one of the key reasons why migration to Austria is higher than 
to other EU countries.  
Germany differs sharply from the Austrian case. Unemployment is particularly high in 
neighbour regions to Eastern Europe; the new Länder have an average unemployment rate of 
17.5 per cent (excluding eastern Berlin). This fact implies three aspects: First, as mentioned 
before, the political salience of unemployment is in Germany higher than anywhere else in 
Europe (Baxandall '01). It remains unclear, however, whether high salience is a response to 
ongoing problems in the labour market, or whether it is part of the problem, since it possibly 
increases the political gridlock among political actors (Bolle, et al. '02). Second, one way or the 
other, high unemployment is at least in part a result of poor labour market institutions.
9 
Therefore, eastward enlargement generates other channels of pressure on the German labour 
market than in the Austrian case. Higher unemployment creates less migration to the official 
German labour market, since job opportunities for CEEC-workers are low. Illegal forms of 
migration, however, take place and lead to a booming shadow economy (Schneider '02). Hence, 
opportunity costs of ‘forfeited’ migration are higher in Germany, and the balance between the 
official and the shadow economy is tilted more and more towards the latter.
10  
The result of these processes is a high politicisation of economic integration in as far as 
labour market issues are concerned. Policy-makers have responded to this trend in an ambivalent 
way. They have tried to enhance the efficiency gains from enlargement by making the German 
legal system more liberal in terms of migration and national citizenship (Kemmerling, Pogodda, 
and Spannbauer '02). On the other hand such attempts are limited at best and, frequently, 
produce political failures, since the political and societal resistance against such policies is fierce. 
On the other hand, political representatives of sectors bound to loose from integration, try to 
reform German labour market institutions in a way that would encapsulate their voters from a 
helter-skelter accession of CEECs.  
                                                 
7 This empirical section is meant to be a follow-up of the previous RI on labour markets. 
8 Cf. Kiander (2002: 23); own simple regressions show that average unemployment rates over the last decade, 
significantly reduced the stock of CEEC-citizens in Western Europe (cf. Annex 1). 
9 For example, Nickell (Nickell '97), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).  
10 Another, but related mechanism is the likelihood of increasing capital and FDI-outflows due to regulatory 
differences and their products such as higher non-wage labour costs.   11 
The net effect for increasing flexibility and capacity in the official German labour market 
and, thereby, for absorbing CEEC migrants is therefore unclear. It mirrors the general debate 
how to reform German labour market institutions which, currently, comes under the heading of 
the so-called Hartz-Reform. Initially designed to be a reform of the German public employment 
agency, its self-declared aim was to resolve the general problem of unemployment in Germany. 
This claim is overly ambitious in the eyes of most economic research institute monitoring the 
reform (SVR '02), since substantive reforms, namely the reorganisation of the low-wage sector, 
have been carefully avoided.
11 
Since labour market shocks will be much smaller for Belgium, the Netherlands and 
France, the discussion on labour market policies can be brief. The Dutch labour market is 
hallmarked by a period of considerable success – at least in terms of official unemployment rates. 
The Netherlands even run the risk of increasing labour shortage. This implies that additional 
workforce from abroad may be an important asset. Such a positive outlook notwithstanding, the 
issue of migration ranks high on the political agenda in the Netherlands and has led to a series of 
restrictions for foreign workers (Vink '02). Belgium struggles with its high unemployment rates. 
Benchmarking studies (Bertelsmann '02) concede some improvements, namely in form of 
reduced labour costs, but the general capacity of political institutions to implement substantive 
reforms seems to be low. France, finally, is another example for a country, where the labour 
market effects of enlargement have not produced much societal or political disturbance. 
Moreover, for a couple of years the French government has been experimenting with several, at 
times, contradictory ways how to combat unemployment. These policies range from a general 
reduction of maximum working time, to subsidies for the low wage sector, none of which has 
substantially decreased unemployment so far. 
All things considered, theory provides little guidance for forecasting the impact Ezoneplus 
has on labour market reforms in Germany. Belgium, the Netherlands and France all are examples 
for countries where the impact will be small and, hence, the general reform debate follows other 
concerns. Austria, in contrast, has clearly a high stake in the enlargement process, not least 
because the Austrian labour market performs relatively well. In Germany the problem is similar 
but different in tone. High unemployment rates reduce official migration, but probably cause 
large influxes to the shadow economy. German policy responses have hence been rather 
ambivalent and do not show clear signals for CEECs labour markets trying to reduce their own 
national unemployment rates. 
 
3.2. National Social Security Systems 
As far as social security systems are concerned, analogous comments apply. Considered as 
a form of real rigidities, social security systems have only reluctantly been reformed and show a 
high degree of institutional inertia. Once again, we start the (theory-based) discussion with a brief 
comment on the impact EMU and ‘Maastricht’ have had on social policies. Then we deal with 
the specific effects Ezoneplus might have. Finally, we contrast this literature to the more general 
quest for the determinants of social policies, by asking what actually drives the demand for social 
expenditures.  
The ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP) as well as the initial ‘Maastricht criteria’ should 
have a sizeable impact on the evolution of public deficits and accumulated public debt in Western 
Europe. Since social expenditures consume a major part of the public budget, fiscal consolidation 
affects social security systems directly. The regulation of fiscal policy on the EU-level is, however, 
no datum – at least not for larger member countries. The recent discussion on the Pact embodies 
                                                 
11 There are, however, a couple of steps towards this direction (e.g. additional tax exemptions for minor jobs), but a 
significant impact of these measures remains to be seen.   12 
this problem rather drastically.
12 It shows that – although there is some path-dependency within 
institutions – if opportunity costs of the Pact are too large, rational policy-makers are tempted to 
dilute these institutions accordingly. In other words, if societal responses to socio-economic 
hardship are strong enough, the social dimension may have a serious feedback on fiscal policy 
and market outcomes.  
Next, if we assume that the EU and EMU constraints are credible, this prompts the 
question of consequences for national policy-making. Political economy approaches to fiscal 
adjustment also try to model the behaviour of national governments exposed to EMU-
constraints. According to this literature, an imposition of external constraints such as the Pact, 
may seriously back-fire, since rational policy-makers will cut budget categories not according to 
efficiency but according to minimising political and private losses, i.e. rents (Easterly '98). The 
next Box (no. 2) will show the problems of reducing public deficits for the case of Belgium. 
Box 2 Pitfalls of Fiscal Adjustment – the Case of Belgium 
Because of its high initial stock of public debt, Belgium may serve as an example how EMU exerts pressure 
on national fiscal policies. This may also provide a guideline how to evaluate additional pressure on public budgets 
coming from structural adjustment in the wake of Eastward enlargement.  
As a matter of fact, the Belgian government managed to reduce cumulative debt considerably. Debt-to-
GDP ratio peaked in the early ‘90s at around 140 per cent and has been shrinking since by some 30 percentage 
points. The annual deficit declined even more drastically from around 10 per cent to a superavit of point five per 
cent. One major source – apart from endogenous reduction, i.e. debt services –  of consolidation is wage constraint 
exerted by trade unions which affects personal expenditure for public sector workers. The other source is declining 
public investment (BELFIN '02). The key problem of rising government debt, however,  is social transfers to 
households due to social security systems. These transfers have only been marginally reduced and oscillate currently 
around the level of 1993 (see graph below). 
 



























Source: own graph on basis of (BELFIN '02). 
The evaluation of the fiscal consolidation in Belgium is straightforward. On the one side reducing 
government debt hinges upon a fragile consensus between social partners. For the government this budget position 
is difficult to control and even more difficult to plan for the future. On the other side, the government prefers 
cutting potentially productive investments in public infrastructure to retrenching the welfare state. From a political 
economy point of view, this is obvious since transfers are direct payments to voters and, hence, highly sensitive to 
reductions. In that respect, Belgium seems to be a good example why – to paraphrase William Easterly (Easterly '98) 
– fiscal adjustment is an illusion: in the short term, public protest would simply be too costly to allow for substantial 
structural reforms. 
                                                 
12 Cf. recent interviews of Romano Prodi, president of the EU-commission: ‘Prodi disowns 
'stupid' stability pact’ (The Guardian October 18, 2002). 
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Enlargement of the euro-zone has to be related to the overall context of EMU for current 
member countries. Potential labour market shocks stemming from Eastward enlargement, will be 
more difficult to handle than without the restrictions on monetary and fiscal policies. A second 
potential source of disturbance has already been mentioned as the problem of ‘social dumping’. If 
both problems apply, social security systems will face the double challenge of increasing 
expenditures vs. declining revenues. A higher inflow of (younger) workers from CEECs could 
mitigate these consequences, but hinges upon the capacity of western European labour markets 
to integrate the additional work force. Hence, the total net effect of enlargement remains unclear 
and depends, we argue, on the determinants that drive the demand for national social policy. 
There is an extremely large literature on the determinants of social policy (Cameron '78; 
Iversen and Cusack '00). Since we focus on political economy we do not touch issues such as 
demographic and sectoral change as well as ‘modernisation’ – the ‘usual suspects’ in this literature 
–, but look at different political approaches to explain rises in redistribution, social security 
transfers and the like. A prime avenue to be taken here is the median-voter theorem (Gradstein 
and Milanovic '00; Meltzer and Richard '91). Simply stated, it argues that the demand for 
redistributive social policy depends on the relative income of the median voter. The empirical 
evidence for this thesis is mixed, at best (Milanovic '99). There are several rival theories to explain 
this shortcoming (Persson and Tabellini '02). Apart from older approaches that focussed on the 
role of insider-outsider problems, interest groups and/ or the bureaucracy, critiques of this thesis 
argue that it underestimates the insurance character of social policy (Iversen and Soskice '00). 
Once again, these debates resemble the case of labour market regulation (Agell '02). This is to say 
that specific ‘social policies’ such as unemployment benefits may be explained either along the 
lines of the rent-seeking or the insurance-seeking literature (Saint-Paul 2000). 
Whatever the approach to be taken, some consequences remain markedly stable across 
paradigms. For example, an increase in unemployment, rather unsurprisingly, should lead to a 
higher demand for social policy as a means of compensation (Greskovits '98). An alternative 
foundation for this result is delivered by approaches modelling the ‘optimal speed of transition’ 
(Aghion and Blanchard '94). In this literature, unemployment is a key variable for government 
behaviour, namely to initiate and steer privatisation. The term ‘transition’ should not be seen as 
exclusively related to CEECs only, but could be also applied to notions of structural change in 
western European labour markets. The true question of this approach boils down to the idea of 
explaining policy reform, or of endogenizing policies. In our context, it could determine the level 
of unemployment benefits as well as the amount of general social transfers. 
 A second key determinant of the demand for social policy is inequality. Ceteris paribus, it 
raises the demand for social expenditure, since it strengthens the political clout of rent-seekers 
and it increases the uncertainty of voters.
13 In addition, rising inequality may be viewed as the flip 
side of rising unemployment, since the sources of unemployment, arguably, are based on some 
aspects of redistribution caused by modern welfare states.
14  
In short, the demand for social policy responds positively to increasing inequality and 
unemployment. Increases in social policy may reduce inequality, but the impact on 
unemployment is ambivalent, since – at least in western Europe – the tax burden of social policy 
codetermines unemployment (Kemmerling '02a). If unemployment rates escalate (or stagnate on 
a high level) the process could end up in a bad equilibrium. 
                                                 
13 This argument is contested in the literature. Whether inequality determines the level of material insecurity in a 
society depends on additional factors such as socio-economic mobility (Alesina, et al. '01). 
14 Of course, the link between unemployment and inequality is not easily established. Hence there is a large literature 
on this cf. (Freeman '95; Hölscher '01). But if suffices to say that continental Europe has a huge employment 
problem with the so-called low wage sector (Scharpf '97).   14 
 
 
Box 3 Unemployment, Inequality and the Demand for Social Policy – a Stylised Model 
A simplified chain of arguments for explaining the impact of Ezoneplus on national social policy could be 
organised around the following punch lines:  
o  Eastward enlargement of the euro-zone increases either unemployment or inequality or both. 
o  People affected by unemployment or inequality will ‘voice’ their discomfort 
o  This, in turn, affects decision-makers and could increase the demand for social policy, i.e. transfers 
o  If supply of social policy is fixed because of fiscal consolidation 
=> societal unrest (protests etc.)? 
o  If supply of social policy increases  
=> additional burden may induce new unemployment 
=> whether demand for social policy is reduced remains open 
=> Growth and Stability pact is diluted. 
 
Clearly, Box 3 sketches a very crude version of a model, or chain of arguments, containing lots of 
empirical and theoretical pitfalls. Nevertheless, it exemplifies some of the fundamental trade-offs 
between long-term financial sustainability and short-term societal disappointment. To repeat, the 
overall impact of Ezoneplus may be small, but it adds to the general predicament and may toss the 
scales towards a bad equilibrium. But before coming to the societal responses to these processes, 
let’s briefly turn to each country for a monitoring of the current reform debates on social security 
systems. 
Most comparative studies state that Germany is the prime example of institutional gridlock 
(`Reformstau’) these days (Bertelsmann '02). There have been some cautious attempts to reform 
the public pension system and to introduce a private supplementary pension system, the Riester-
Rente, named after the previous minister for social affairs. However, this pension is voluntary 
and its acceptance in the population is, so far, low. Hence, pension systems – sooner or later – 
will be back on the political agenda, since the financing gap of the public insurance system is 
once again widening (ibid.). In addition, the system of public health is the next major project 
containing ‘political dynamite’. Problems are similar to pensions and primarily financial in nature.  
Whereas Austria shares a relatively high tax burden with Germany, its public budget is nearly 
balanced. Expenditure for unemployment insurance are markedly lower than in Germany, also 
because duration of benefits is relatively short for continental European welfare states 
(Bertelsmann '02). Nevertheless, current debates on tax reforms show that further reforms are 
much more problematic to achieve. The resignation of the last Austrian government was – at 
least officially – due to diverging opinions on reducing the tax burden.  
As for Belgium, one of the major issues is still how to finance the welfare state (cf. Box 2). 
Expenditures for pension, health and unemployment benefits are among the highest in Europe 
(cf. Kemmerling et al. ‘02). In France, achieving a balanced budget by containing social 
expenditures is also the major point of political struggles these days. Policies to reduce 
unemployment have turned out to be rather costly from a budget perspective and the public 
health system is causing additional troubles. The sole example of little pressure from the public 
budget are the Netherlands. Mainly because of mixed public and private systems of old-age 
security and health, the level of social expenditures is rather limited. In addition, net levels of 
social transfers are surprisingly low for continental European standards (Kemmerling, Pogodda, 
and Spannbauer '02). 
Summing this part of the RI up, the trade-off between financial and social stability is probably the 
most important political problem continental European governments have to face at the   15 
beginning of this century. Reforms seem to be necessary, but highly unpopular, and therefore 
rarely persecuted in a radical fashion. Because of the ongoing social problems in some member 
countries, the public opinion and of some politicians have turned their eyes to Brussels in the 
hope of getting additional transfers.  
 
3.3. EU-Policies: Structural Funds and Common Agricultural Policy 
The major results so far were that a) migration may be seriously impeded, above all, by 
maintaining non-clearing labour markets, and that b) the demand for social policy, if it is affected 
at all, will increase. Whereas the first is primarily a problem of the accession candidates, the 
second point also affects current member states. Both issues necessarily prompt the question of 
how EU-policies may mitigate or deteriorate financing the losers of integration, once enlargement 
has taken place. The theory of optimal currency areas would imply that – given a low level of 
mobility and migration – increasing fiscal transfers are necessary. Political economists, however, 
would doubt that additional West-East transfers are easy to attain, let alone to distribute 
efficiently. 
As a consequence, this part of the RI reviews the impact which Ezoneplus has on the two 
major components of EU-budget: common agricultural policy (CAP) and structural funds (SFs). 
Once again, it predominantly recurs to the political economy literature and, more specifically, the 
political economy of fiscal federalism as the third theoretical building block on which the 
‘Reshaping of Social and Labour Market Policies’ is based.  
A first point of entry into this literature is by simply anticipating which regions, countries 
and individuals of current member states will loose transfers, and how they will react to this 
problem. Departing from efficiency considerations of the optimal transfer debate in fiscal 
federalism (e.g. Oates '99), ‘pork-barrel politics’ is a handy way of how to conceive this process 
(Cadot, et al. '99; Dixit and Londregan '98). Regions within a country lobby their national 
governments for support, while these governments determine the absolute level of transfers on 
the EU-level. Technically speaking, most recent accounts of such models use a menu auction 
game in the lines of Grossman and Helpman (Grossman and Helpman '94). By this means, the 
demand for SFs and CAP is primarily explained by concerns within a country. A point of further 
complication in these models is the problem of multi-level governance, typical for fiscal 
federalism. Regions may lobby national governments which, in turn, voice their demand in 
Brussels.  
A second point of entry focuses on the set of policy alternatives a national government 
has to respond to enlargement. As, for example, Casella (Casella '02) has shown, the question of 
coordinating redistributive policies between countries hinges upon the capacity of national 
governments to impose barriers to migration. To be sure, these barriers may consist of other 
tools than simply regulating work permits of foreign workers. An important example is the 
discretion of government in granting social assistance and other forms of ‘non-tariff’ migration 
barriers. A more sarcastic, but not totally implausible, way of conceiving this issue is to say that 
governments try to set national rates of unemployment high enough in order to prevent 
migration. 
A third important issue deals with the political economy approach to anticipate reforms of the 
EU budget (Weise '01; '02). Since net contributors in the EU such as Germany and the 
Netherlands, fear substantive additional costs once new countries are accepted, they try to reform 
the EU household before the enlargement. These attempts experience fierce opposition by 
countries that benefit from the status quo, namely France and Spain.  
   16 
Table 3 EU budget positions of current member countries  
(Simulation of expenditures of the EU-15 budget in 2007) 
 
 
  All expenditures  Of which  All 
Contributions 
Net position 
   SFs  CAP     
Austria 1550  216  1217  1856  -306 
Belgium 1367  160  1060  2202  -835 
France 12451  1816  9773  12771  -320 
Germany 11446  3536  6737  18917  -7472 
Netherlands 2211  359  1625  3442  -1232 




0.81 0.30 0.45  0.81   
Source: own graph on basis of (Weise '01). Million Euros in prices of 1999. 
 
Table 3 shows this problem for a simulation of future budget positions of current EU 
member states. Note in this calculation enlargement will not have taken place yet. Accepting 12 
new member countries would imply, for instance, that Germany’s net position would deteriorate 
by some five billion Euro (Weise '01).  
But worse a budget position is not only due to increasing contributions. EU regional 
transfers (SFs) will be redistributed, since many regions of current member countries will be 
pushed above certain thresholds, namely the 75 percentage level in relative income that is 
attached to the so-called Objective 1 (Weise '02). For Germany this implies that six out of seven 
regions won’t be entitled to get SFs in an enlarged Europe. In France three regions, and in 
Belgium and Austria one region will also be dropped.    17 
 
 




Source: (Weise '02) 
Figure 1 shows this problem in terms of the population affected by enlargement. The 
bars represent the share of the future population entitled to Objective 1 funds relative to the 
current Objective 1 population. The shares differ for a set of criteria. If the status quo without 
enlargement applies, 90 percent of the Objective 1 population will maintain their entitlements in 
2007. With enlargement, the share is reduced to around five percent. Figure 1 also shows that 
next to Germany the southern European countries are most affected by the diversion of SFs to 
CEECs. 
The problem of CAP is similar in nature, only that Belgium and France are the main 
beneficiaries of the current situation. However, the logic of reform is inverted. Whereas the 
major criteria for SFs are relative in nature, thus holding absolute levels of SFs more or less 
constant, CAP hinges upon absolute levels of production. In other words, shifting the status quo 
of EU-15 to EU-27 is mainly a zero-sum game, whereas CAP directly affects the absolute size of 
the EU budget. For SFs a reform would be interesting for Germany in order to maintain their 
population within the criteria of entitlement. A reform of CAP would mean the opposite, i.e. 
down-sizing the entire budget. Assuming fierce opposition of farmers in most countries, 
reforming CAP is politically dangerous. The compromise currently emerging out of EU 
negotiations on CAP is thus biased against the future members. At least for a grace period, new 
members will not be entitled to the same proportion of CAP-cash the old members are. 
All things considered, the outcome of pork-barrelling about EU-transfers is yet to be 
seen. As in the areas of national policy, there seems to be a high extent of inertia in both EU 
policies. In opposite ways, this will lead to pronounced redistributive effects for CAP and SFs. 
The national willingness to pay or renounce of transfers will depend, as in the previous cases of 
policy reform, on internal political processes. It is these to which the RI now proceeds.    18 
4. THE POLITICS OF EZONEPLUS 
 
So far, we have merely assumed that societies are reluctant to policy changes in the realms of 
social security and employment. This sort of societal unrest and its political manifestations have 
been treated as unobservable variables. This is quite natural since hard empirical evidence is 
difficult to attain and evaluate. Nevertheless, this part of the RI tries to nail down some of the 
strategies individuals and interest groups have to make this unrest visible. 
Talking about both the winners and losers of the enlargement process generates a major 
question arises: What kinds of strategies do individuals and corporate actors have to complain 
about their losses or promote their benefits in a politically meaningful way? Two distinctions may 
help to organise the argument. First, there is the distinction between ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ strategies 
(Alt, et al. '99). Political actors can either choose to make their complaints observable within the 
political institutions, or they stop their cooperation within these institutions and look for 
alternatives outside. A second distinction deals with the capability of organising the voice 
strategy. Some segments within the population are more apt to form a (unified) political platform 
and to coordinate strategies than others. Hence this difference is best captured by the notion of 
‘organised groups vs. dispersed individuals’. The following 2x2 matrix shows a couple of relevant 
strategies in the enlargement process. 
 
Figure 2 Matrix of political reaction towards enlargement 
 
  Voice  Exit 
Organised  Interest Group Lobbying  FDI, Capital Transfers 






Some of these strategies have already been mentioned in previous parts. This time, 
however, we will look more closely at the empirical evidence for the politics of Ezoneplus. The 
section contains three parts: The first entails a set of issues and indicators dealing with the 
question how general interest in the form of public opinion is affected by enlargement. The next 
will shed light into the question whether and how these anti-enlargement attitudes may be 
transformed into a political position (usually in the form of Eurosceptic parties). The third part 
concentrates on interest groups such as trade unions and farmers’ associations and their capacity 
to ‘voice’ their scepticism towards enlargement. 
 
4.1. Individual Scepticism towards Enlargement 
To begin with, public opinion is a major concern for EU policy makers. Since democratic 
legimitacy of EU decision-making is – at best limited – and Ezoneplus entails a set of problematic 
socio-economic ‘side effects’, taxing the amount of euroscepticism prevalent in the European 
public(s) is an important way of estimating the political problem of the Social Dimension.  
In general terms, the role of public opinion in the political system has been likened to the 
role of prices in market economies (Luhmann 2000: 292). To be elected, politicians have to   19 
monitor public opinion polls, and adapt their policies in a similar fashion in which enterprises use 
prices to make their decisions to invest and produce. This is not to say that politicians always 
follow or adhere to the public opinion, but open violations to such behaviour will seriously 
challenge their future prospects. Hence, analysing public opinion not only gives some taste of 
how reluctant societies might be to the problems Ezoneplus generates – however distorted this 
information may be – it also should be seen as a causes for the previously mentioned lack of 
policy reforms and the delay with which policies are being reshaped. 
The empirical evidence suggests that public agreement on Eastward enlargement is, in 
some countries, ‘a close race’. Figure 3 shows the share of the population that agrees with the 
enlargement of the European Union. Apart from the Netherlands, in none of the six countries 
the pro-enlargement group is above 50 percent of the population. Though there are some signs 
of an ascending trend, volatility of public opinion is typically high as may be seen in the case of 
the Dutch population.  
 
Figure 3 Public Opinion on EU enlargement 












Source: Eurobarometer, various years. 
 
Eurobarometer Data (Eurobarometer '02) also cautiously suggests that issue salience of 
enlargement varies across Europe. If people are directly asked how important enlargement maybe 
for themselves or their respective country, differences in average national responses are small 
(ibid.: 10). If, however, questions are issued that try to tax the knowledge of people about 
enlargement, proximity plays an important role in explaining national differences (ibid.: 31). 
Unfortunately, Eurobarometer Data does not reveal much information about potential 
determinants of attitudes. The few categories that are inquired (cf. Annex 2) suggest three pro- 
vs. contra-enlargement cleavages: young vs. old, workers vs. other employees, urban vs. rural 
areas. Apart from the first one, these differences are easy to explain by using standard theory of 
international economic integration (Kemmerling '02b). According to the previous parts of this 
RI, workers may fear the detrimental impact on their wage and social transfer levels, whereas 
rural areas are afraid of a potential diversion of CAP- and SF-cash.   20 
 
3.2. Consequences of Individual Euroscepticism: Voice or Exit? 
How is Euroscepticism transformed into party politics? Unfortunately, so far there has little 
research been done on the direct impact enlargement may have.
15 A trick, which has figured 
prominently in previous parts of this RI, is to use general information about the EU and EMU 
and put this into the context of enlargement. Annex 3 contains information of recent study about 
the extent of general Euroscepticism in both national public opinion and national party systems. 
According to the authors (Taggart and Szczerbiak '02), parties may be classified into three groups: 
hard euroscepticism, soft euroscepticism and no (open) euroscepticism.
16 They maintain that 
there is no perfect fit between the level of Euroscepticism in the public opinion and the size of 
anti-European parties in national parliaments. Country studies show that the reasons for the 
success or failure of anti-European parties differ profoundly from country to country (ibid.).  
 
 
Table 4 Euroscepticism in the public opinion and the party system compared 
 
 Austria  Belgium  France  Germany  Netherlands 
Euroscepticism in Public Opinion 
 0.21  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.09 
Parties’ Euroscepticism 
Hard 0.00  0.09  0.27  0.03  0.00 
Soft 0.27  0.00  0.04  0.05  0.16 
Source: Taggart and Szczerbiak '02. 
Notes: Euroscepticism is measured as the percentage of people disagreeing with enlargement in 
the 1998 Eurobarometer survey 
(third line), or the percentage of parties strongly or weakly rejecting enlargement (fifth and sixth 
line). 
 
Hardliners, in particular, are not members of any government in Europe (ibid.: 16). The political 
clout of anti-enlargement parties is therefore clearly limited. Most interestingly, Germany has 
shown a marked resilience against Euroscepticism and anti-enlargement parties, a fact that has 
been related to its federalist political system (Lees '02). The one exception, where Euroscepticism 
features prominently in the political system, is France. However, enlargement has, so far, never 
been made to a major issue during recent election campaigns.
17 Soft euroscepticism, frequently 
related to enlargement issues such as the alleged explosion of the EU budget, is strong in Austria 
and the Netherlands. In both countries, parties with an outspoken, but not extremist scepticism 
towards enlargement are or have been in national governments.  
                                                 
15 For western Europe, at least, enlargement has, so far, not featured as a significant political issue along which party 
systems could be arranged (Gabel and Anderson '02; Sitter '02). 
16 The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ notions of Euroscepticism is drawn on the question whether European 
integration is generally rejected or only some aspects of it such as the monetary union. 
17 Cf. RIIA/OERN Election Briefing No. 4 
(http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/oern/ElectionBriefings/index.html, 10.11.02).   21 
All things considered, party politics does not seem to be a major ‘avenue’ for societal discontent 
against enlargement. However, for some parties it seems to be a handy ‘tool’ for mobilising 
critical and, at times, extremist voters as the following box suggests. 
 
Box 4 Temelin – Austria’s Referendum Against Enlargement 
From the 14th to the 21st of January 2001 the Austrian electorate was called for a public referendum initiated by the 
FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs). The official title of the “Volksbegehren” was ‘veto against Temelin’, a Czech 
nuclear power plant in the boarder region to Austria. Though the trigger of this referendum were (allegedly) poor 
safety standards of the power plant, parties leaders of the FPÖ openly admitted that the referendum should be seen 
as a protest against the way how enlargement takes place (Plasser and Ulram '02). 
Roughly 900 000 people, about 15 percent of the electorate, voted against Temelin. An analysis of the voters shows 
that the referendum had little to do with environmental concerns (Plasser and Ulram '02). Only 8 per cent of green 
voters signed the referendum, whereas more than 40 per cent of FPÖ supporters. More importantly, around a 
quarter of those who signed the referendum are openly against enlargement. 
The referendum against Temelin was closely related to two other dominant issues in the Austrian public related to 
enlargement: labour market issues and the so-called Benes decrees. Whereas labour market issues are relatively easy 
explained given the results of previous section, the Benes decrees constitute an entirely different issue area related to 
the historical legacy of Austria. In 1945 the first President of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Benes, sanctioned all acts that 
had happened in the course of the eviction of German and Austrian inhabitants of the Czech territory. Since the 
decrees are still part of the corpus of national legislation in the Czech Republic, they are a major source of 
disturbance in the bilateral diplomatic relations with Austria. Especially among older people and supports of right-
wing positions, these decrees are an indignity. The example also shows that – whereas general Euroscepticism cannot 
be attached to the traditional left-right divide in the political spectrum, anti-enlargement opinions are frequently 
correlated with extremist attitudes in terms of xenophobia. 
 
 
The Box on Temelin has shown that there is some, though weakly to be established relationship 
between criticism against enlargement and  populist or sometimes even xenophobic tendencies. 
Especially because of issues concerning labour markets and social security systems, the political 
discussion on enlargement is, now and then fused with explicitly nationalistic positions 
(Kemmerling and Bolle '02).  
Next to these different aspects of voicing political protests, the Social Dimension also has to deal 
with the phenomena of exit strategies for individuals in response to enlargement. One of these 
strategies has also been discussed: the rising share of informal and illegal market transactions, i.e. 
the shadow economy, which may be seen as an indication for such an effect induced by 
enlargement.
18 Another way, though clearly more passive, is political alienation. A larger 
European Union and a larger monetary union in particular, may foster this process to 
significantly higher levels. An example is the notoriously low voter turnout for elections of the 
European Parliament. Most interestingly for our context, one of the determinants for turnout 
figures is the amount of subsidies granted to a country (Mattila '01). Abstention as well as other 
exit strategies may not endanger enlargement directly, but arguably produce a negative feedback 
loop to the integration process in the long run. 
 
4.3. Specific Interest Groups, Public Protests and other ‘Veto-Points’ 
To be sure, data on public opinion, Euroscepticism or voter turnout is prone to well-
known critique. Is public opinion really important in modern political systems? How reliable or 
noise is the information propelled by opinion polls? However, rather than to discard this 
                                                 
18 We believe that enlargement will significantly increase the shadow economy since the black-market demand for 
low-wage jobs is high whereas the supply of it, due to high reservation wages, is low for national citizens, but not for 
illegal immigrants.   22 
information, we try to find complementary measures for societal discontent with enlargement. 
One of the alternative to polls is to look at the evidence for manifest political protests. The 
politics of Brussels is haunted by frequently occurring manifestations and blockades. But not only 
Brussels is a place to express dissatisfaction, national protests and manifestations may also have a 
linkage to the EU and enlargement. 
 Empirical data on the incidence of genuinely European protests (i.e. protests about EU-
related issues) shows an ascending trend in the nineties (cf. Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Frequency and percentage of Western European contentious events provoked 
by European Union policies and institutions, 1984 to 1997. 
 
 
Source: (Imig '02). 
On the national level, strike is still the most common form of political protest, compared to other 
forms of public protest. For the case of Brussels politics the ‘tone of the discourse’ seems to be 
markedly more confrontational (ibid.: 926). Moreover, EU policies may play a role in causing 
national political predicaments (see above). Hence national waves of protests such as general 
strikes are indirectly related to EU issues. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the occurrence of 
general and mass strikes is related to the attempts of national governments to retrench and 
reform their welfare states, labour markets included.
19  
Most manifest and regularly occurring forms of political protest presuppose political agents 
endowed with the necessary capabilities and resources to organise these protests. Two likely 
candidates that potentially provide political agency of Euroscepticism are trade unions and 
sectoral interest groups, namely farmers’ associations.  
All things considered, the way societal reactions are transformed into political concerns depends 
on the specific policy area, but also on nationally idiosyncratic facts. Labour market regulation 
and CAP will affect major national veto players, i.e. special interest groups. Social security 
systems are rather a problem of ‘general interest politics’ (Persson and Tabellini '02). No matter 
what transmission channel is argued for, societies will react towards enlargement and lead to a 
reshaping of policy areas which is different from pure market outcomes. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Note, for instance, the recent general strikes in Italy and Portugal, the latter being directly related to attempts of 
the government to obey to the EMU-rules for fiscal policy.   23 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This RI showed some of the social and political problems arising from the eastward enlargement 
of the eurozone in Western European countries. At least in the short run, Ezoneplus may affect 
some segments of the population negatively. These social conflicts are a major reason why the 
policy areas analysed here are reacting rather sluggishly to the enlargement process and do not 
neatly fit into to broad picture of the reshaping of policies sketched for the areas of monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies. Rational governments and other politically relevant actors take 
up these fears and transform them into national policies. 
Synopsis 1 summarises the major problem areas of enlargement. Austria seems to be mainly 
affected by the inflow of additional workforce. Though this may stimulate additional growth and 
efficiency gains, it may also demand additional reforms in terms of labour market regulation. In 
that respect the Austrian situation resembles the Dutch one. Germany is probably most seriously 
affected by enlargement. It may not only loose in terms of structural funds, but high social 
standards are attractive to foreign workers, and difficult to maintain because of exploding 
budgets. The German welfare state could arguably need an inflow of migration from CEECs, the 
potential, however, is seriously limited by high unemployment rates. Like the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France are little affected by enlargement. The exception may be French farmers, 
showing a considerable of political clout. In an enlarged Europe, high costs of the social security 
system are still a major area of political discontent in both Belgium and Germany. 
 
Table 5 Synopsis I – Key policy areas of discontent 
 
 Social  Policy  Labour  Market 
Regulation 
SFs CAP 
Austria   x     
Germany x x  x  (East)   
Belgium x     
Netherlands   x     
France       x 
 
Socio-economic conditions are not always directly transformed into political conflicts. To 
the contrary, in some cases resistance against enlargement may be related as much with fears and 
a lack of information as with true material hardship. Synopsis II summarises the major 
transmission mechanisms analysed in this input. Public opinion plays a major role in Austria and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent, in Germany, since both countries share boarders with CEECs and a 
history overshadowed by bad memories. Anti-enlargement sentiments do not feature prominently 
in Germany, whereas in Austria and the Netherlands they do. Given the relative un-affectedness 
of the Netherlands this may come as a surprise and clearly alludes to the aforementioned aspects 
of fear and ignorance. Enlargement-sceptic interest groups exert influence in Germany (mainly 
trade unions) and France and Belgium (farmers’ associations). Alienation, in terms of low 
electoral turnout, though not a direct threat to enlargement, seems to play a role in both 
Germany and the Netherlands, for distinct reasons though, since, for example, party and interest 
group politics are differently organised in both countries.   24 
 
 
Table 6 Synopsis II – Key political responses of discontent 
 
  Public Opinion  Parties  Interest Groups  Alienation 
Austria x  x     
Germany x    x x 
Belgium     x  
Netherlands   x  x 
France     x  
 
Taken these main points together, they show that enlargement exerts a strong influence 
on the policy areas inspected here. The lack of policy adjustment is mainly due to countervailing 
trends in society that produce an impact on national policy-making. The discussion shows that 
there are no automatic stabilisers that can guarantee a smooth and profound reshaping and that 
simultaneously induce optimal gains in efficiency. Most likely, enlargement costs, and those of 
CEECs in particular, are not easily absorbed by markets in the short run. To the contrary, 
political bargains on the national and EU-level will arise, and force the EU itself to dedicate more 
money ‘than necessary’ to the enlargement process. Since the only political alternative would be 
to open up and deregulate labour markets, and the German one in particular, net contributors 
will ‘gladly’ pay that price instead of facing the political costs of national social conflicts. 
   25 
Annex 1: Unemployment and the Size of Migration to Western Europe 
 
  Size of Migration in 1999 
(CEEC-citizen/national population) 
Avg. unemployment rate (90-99)  -0.05  (0.02)  * 
Dummy for neighbouring country  0.43  (0.14)  * 
Intercept 0.54  0,21  * 
Nobs. 15     
Adjusted R^2 (SE of Estimate)  0.47  (0.26)   
F-Test     6.71  * 
White-Test   4.07   
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Annex 2: Eurobarometer 2002: 23. 
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